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ABSTRACT 
 In Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One the Alaska Supreme Court decided 
that pre-litigation payments made for insurance purposes by the defendant 
must be credited to the entire measure of damages, including the percentage 
attributed to the plaintiff, unless specific qualifying language is included with 
the payment. This ruling creates an inequitable distribution of damages 
whereby the defendant shares credit for payments made on the defendant’s 
behalf with the plaintiff, causing offers of judgment made under Rule 68 of the 
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure to become disassociated from actual liability. 
The proposition by the court that pre-litigation payments made by a liability 
insurer would be made on a basis other than the potential fault of the insured 
defies both common sense and the profit motive of insurance companies. The 
solution to this problem lies in the court’s constitutional power to establish 
rules of procedure making clear that pre-litigation payments should be credited 
to the party on whose behalf the payments were made. In the meantime, 
insurers should protect themselves by qualifying any such payments on the 
basis of potential fault. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One,1 the Alaska Supreme Court 
confronted the question of whether or not a defendant should receive full 
credit for pre-litigation payments made to the plaintiff by the defendant’s 
insurer when determining whether the plaintiff beat a subsequent defense 
offer of judgment under Rule 68(b) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The majority found that although the defendant’s Rule 68 offer of 
judgment unambiguously constituted an additional sum, it must be 
credited against the entire measure of damages, including that percentage 
attributed to the plaintiff, unless the prior payment was accompanied by 
specific qualifying language.2 The result is that, for Rule 68(b) purposes, 
both the offeror and offeree are credited with the prior payment to the 
extent of their own contributory fault. 
The Alaska Supreme Court made no apparent move to change the 
traditional common law rule that a defendant is entitled to offset prior 
payments made to the plaintiff against a judgment subsequently entered 
against her.3 The result is a dichotomy in the application of pre-litigation 
 
 1. 170 P.3d 173 (Alaska 2007). 
 2. Id. at 179–80. 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A, cmt. a (1979). Indeed, two 
weeks after the Alaska Supreme Court decided Jackman, it confirmed this principle 
in Turner v. Anchorage, 171 P.3d 180 (Alaska 2007). In Turner, the court held that 
“[u]nder the common law a tort award may be offset by any amount previously 
paid by a defendant (or its insurer) towards its tort liability,” and that the principle 
“includes payments made to a plaintiff’s subrogated insurer.” Id. at 188 (citing 
Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 791 (Alaska 1999) (payment to 
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payments by the defendant’s insurer, depending upon whether the trial 
court is calculating the judgment to which the plaintiff is entitled or if the 
plaintiff recovered more than the defendant’s Rule 68 offer of judgment. In 
creating this dichotomy, the Jackman Court failed to consider the very 
nature of the insurance agreement under which prior payments are made 
and answered equitable objections with unsatisfying legal formalism. 
Moreover, the court’s rule creates additional equitable concerns not 
addressed by either the majority or Justice Carpeneti’s concurring opinion. 
This Comment argues that the Jackman rule for allocating prior 
payments under Rule 68(b) is unsound and should be abrogated through 
the court’s constitutional rule-making power4 to conform to the common 
law rule for applying prior payments to judgments against the payor. In 
the meantime, this Comment discusses methods by which civil defendants 
and their insurers can protect their interests in light of the rule in Jackman. 
 
II.  JACKMAN AND THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE 
A. The Decision 
Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One arose out of a slip and fall on an icy 
staircase in the plaintiff’s apartment building.5 Ms. Jackman’s injuries 
required medical treatment, and Jewel Lake Villa’s insurer paid 
approximately $3500 to reimburse the plaintiff for these expenses.6 Ms. 
Jackman subsequently sued Jewel Lake Villa, alleging that the building 
owner’s failure to remove the ice was negligent and sought $75,000 in 
damages.7 
Before trial, Jewel Lake Villa made an “offer of judgment” of $1400 to 
Ms. Jackman.8 Under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68, either party may 
make an offer of judgment up to ten days before trial;9 if the Rule 68 offer is 
 
plaintiff); Brinkerhoff v. Swearingen Aviation Corp., 663 P.2d 937, 942 (Alaska 1983) 
(payment to subrogated insurer)). 
 4. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15. 
 5. 170 P.3d at 175. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68 (2007) provides, in relevant part: 
(a)    At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, either the party 
making a claim or the party defending against a claim may serve 
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be entered in 
complete satisfaction of the claim for the money or property or to the 
effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. The offer may not 
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not accepted and the other side does not obtain a result at trial that is a 
specified percentage better than the Rule 68 offer, the offeree must pay a 
heightened portion of the offeror’s attorney’s fees.10 
After trial, the jury found total damages to Ms. Jackman of 
approximately $7100.11 The jury found Ms. Jackman to be comparatively 
negligent, and assessed her 49% of the fault for the accident. Jewel Lake 
Villa’s portion of fault, 51%, therefore resulted in liability of approximately 
$3650.12 Jewel Lake Villa moved for attorney’s fees. It argued that its 
insurer had already paid $3500, and that this amount should be set off 
against the verdict, leaving approximately $900 (including pre-judgment 
interest and attorney’s fees under a different rule).13 Ms. Jackman had 
therefore not “beaten” Jewel Lake Villa’s $1400 offer of judgment, entitling 
Jewel Lake Villa to attorney’s fees under Rule 68. 
 
be revoked in the 10 day period following service of the offer. If 
within 10 days after service of the offer the adverse party serves 
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the 
offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service, and the 
clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted within 10 days is 
considered withdrawn, and evidence of the offer is not admissible 
except in a proceeding to determine costs. The fact that an offer is 
made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. 
(b)    If the judgment finally rendered by the court is at least 5 percent less 
favorable to the offeree than the offer, or, if there are multiple 
defendants, at least 10 percent less favorable to the offeree than the 
offer, the offeree, whether the party making the claim or defending 
against the claim, shall pay all costs as allowed under the Civil Rules 
and shall pay reasonable actual attorney’s fees incurred by the offeror 
from the date the offer was made as follows . . . . 
 10. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(b) establishes a scale of percentages for attorney’s fee 
awards under the Rule, depending on the timing of the offer: 
(1)    if the offer was served no later than 60 days after the date established 
in the pretrial order for initial disclosures required by Civil Rule 26, 
the offeree shall pay 75 percent of the offeror’s reasonable actual 
attorney’s fees; 
(2)    if the offer was served more than 60 days after the date established in 
the pretrial order for initial disclosures required by Civil Rule 26 but 
more than 90 days before the trial began, the offeree shall pay 50 
percent of the offeror’s reasonable actual attorney’s fees; 
(3)    if the offer was served 90 days or less but more than 10 days before 
the trial began, the offeree shall pay 30 percent of the offeror’s 
reasonable actual attorney’s fees. 
 11. Jackman, 170 P.3d at 175. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at 175–76. 
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Ms. Jackman appealed the superior court’s attorney’s fee award to 
Jewel Lake Villa.14 The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding that for 
the purposes of determining whether Ms. Jackman beat its offer of 
judgment under Rule 68(b), Jewel Lake Villa was not entitled to offset its 
insurer’s $3500 payment against the portion of damages for which the jury 
determined it was liable.15 Instead, the court held that Jewel Lake Villa’s 
payment must be offset against the total amount of damages without 
regard to the jury’s allocation of fault between the parties.16 
The majority began by holding that the only reasonable interpretation 
of Jewel Lake Villa’s offer of judgment was that it was a “new money” 
offer—an offer to pay $1400 in addition to the $3500 that its insurer had 
already paid.17 The majority then turned to the “more difficult problem” of 
whether to deduct the earlier payment from (1) the jury’s entire measure of 
damages or (2) the measure of damages apportioned by the jury to Jewel 
Lake Villa.18 
The majority found no evidence that Jewel Lake Villa’s insurer’s $3500 
payment constituted a liability payment or that it was based on the fault of 
Jewel Lake Villa.19 Instead, the court concluded that the “insurer appears to 
have unconditionally reimbursed [the plaintiff] for her medical expenses: 
there is no indication of any reservations or restrictions suggesting that the 
reimbursements were paid as compensation for [the insured’s] potential 
share of the fault.”20 The majority brushed aside concerns that crediting the 
insurer’s payment against the total damages rather than Jewel Lake Villa’s 
portion thereof would result in Jewel Lake Villa paying for more than its 
fair share of the damages, or that it would allow a double recovery for the 
plaintiff.21 The majority concluded that these arguments “mistakenly 
assume that an insurer’s unconditional advance payments of medical 
expenses must necessarily be payments based on fault.”22 Thus, the 
majority concluded: 
[W]hen a defendant seeking Rule 68 fees claims an offset for 
medical expenses paid to the plaintiff without reservation or 
restriction before suit was filed, the advance payments must be 
 
 14. Id. at 176–77. 
 15. See id. at 179–80. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 177–78. 
 18. Id. at 178. 
 19. Id. at 179. 
 20. Id. at 178. 
 21. See id. at 179. 
 22. Id. 
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deducted from the total award of damages to establish the final 
judgment’s comparative value unless the defendant shows that 
the payments actually compensated the plaintiff for liability 
based on the defendant’s fault.23 
Justice Carpeneti, concurring only in the result, took issue with the 
majority’s distinction between partial payments made by an insurer based 
on its insured’s fault and those made apparently without condition.24 He 
noted that the proposition that a liability insurer would make a payment 
on a basis other than the potential fault of its insured defied common 
sense.25 He also noted that this rule was in conflict with the common law 
rule that a defendant should be credited fully with payments made to the 
plaintiff and frustrated Alaska public policy of settling disputes and 
encouraging early payment to injured parties.26 
Justice Carpeneti, however, would have held for the plaintiff on the 
grounds that Jewel Lake Villa’s offer of judgment was ambiguous as to the 
treatment of the prior payment and must therefore be construed against 
Jewel Lake Villa.27 The majority squarely rejected this contention as 
precluded by its precedent.28 
 
B. Unconditional Insurance Payments and Unjust Enrichment 
1. The nature of insurance and the fiction of the “unconditional payment.” 
The Jackman majority’s holding that Jewel Lake Villa was not entitled to 
offset its insurer’s payment against its own adjudged liability is based on 
its conclusion that the insurer paid Ms. Jackman’s medical expenses on an 
“unconditional” basis, rather than as the result of any fault on the part of 
its insured.29 Justice Carpeneti’s concurrence correctly indicted this 
conclusion as contrary to common sense.30 However, while the 
concurrence’s appeal to common sense is correct, it requires greater 
elucidation. 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 181 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. (Carpeneti, J., concurring) (“It defies common sense because there is no 
reason to think that the defendant’s insurer was making payments to the insured 
plaintiff for any reason other than to cover its insured’s potential fault.”). 
 26. Id. (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 180–81 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
 28. Id. at 177–78 (citing Rules v. Sturn, 661 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1983)). 
 29. Id. at 178. 
 30. See id. at 181 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
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The reasoning underlying the concurrence’s appeal to common sense 
lies in the very nature of the insurance business and the insurance contract. 
Insurers contract with their insured to assume certain risks. These risks 
may include damage to the insured’s own property or the costs of medical 
treatment for the insured. In the case of liability insurance, which was at 
issue in Jackman, the risk is that the insured will become legally obligated to 
pay as a result of an unintentionally inflicted injury to another person or 
damage to the property of another.31 A typical insuring agreement in a 
Commercial General Liability Policy might read as follows: “[The insurer] 
will pay all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages because of 
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ . . . .”32 
Thus, when the insured is alleged to have injured a third party in a 
manner covered by the policy, the insurer must defend the lawsuit filed by 
the third party against the insured and pay the insured’s liability up to the 
insurance policy limits.33 In short, there is no reason for a liability insurer to 
make any payment to a third party, such as Ms. Jackman, who was 
allegedly injured through the negligence of its insured, except on account 
of the insured’s potential fault.34 Indeed, one commentator has noted that 
 
 31. The reason the concurrence appeals to common sense is because most 
Alaskans have at least one form of liability insurance. Section 28.22.011 of the 
Alaska Statutes requires all drivers to maintain liability insurance with statutorily 
designated minimum liability limits. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.22.101 (2006). 
Ubiquitous pitches by cavemen, geckos, and Dennis Haysbert remind us of the 
availability of this insurance and its associated services. 
 32. Makarka v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 14 P.3d 964, 967 (Alaska 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 33. See id. at 969 (“[W]here ‘vagaries [of] law and fact’ are sufficient to create the 
potential that an insured will incur covered liability, the insurer must defend.”). 
 34. The basic obligations of a liability insurer and a Personal Injury Protection 
(PIP) carrier make the majority’s analogy to the treatment of PIP benefits in final 
judgment calculations inapposite. As noted above, liability insurers must make 
payments to third parties depending upon the liability of their own assureds. PIP 
carriers, in contrast, pay benefits to the assured upon injury, without regard to the 
assured’s fault. Thus, in stark contrast with payments by a liability insurer, PIP 
payments are, by definition, without respect to fault. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Farmers 
Ins. Co., 95 P.3d 313, 315 n.1 (Wash. 2004) (“PIP coverage is a form of first party no-
fault benefits. First party benefits are paid to the insured. In contrast, third party 
benefits, such as those provided under liability coverage, are paid to someone other 
than the insured. No-fault benefits are payable regardless of whether the insured is 
at fault for the damages and injuries sustained.”). 
Moreover, the PIP cases cited by the majority do not necessarily involve 
payments made on behalf of the defendant at all. See Norman v. Farrow, 880 So.2d 
557, 558–59 (Fla. 2004) (suit by driver of one car against driver of car who rear-
ended her); Hickenbottom v. Schmidt, 626 P.2d 726 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Each 
motor vehicle owner must carry PIP insurance, which applies to herself and the 
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offers to pay medical expenses are “often made by the defendant’s 
insurance company in an effort to reduce damages wherein the injured 
plaintiff cannot afford the necessary treatment.”35 
To accept the concurrence’s common sense appeal, one need not 
assume that insurance companies are unwilling or reluctant to pay sums 
justly owed. The very facts of the Jackman case suggest precisely the 
opposite—long before the case went to trial, Jewel Lake Villa’s insurer paid 
Ms. Jackman’s medical expenses, which proved to be quite near the 
amount that Jewel Lake Villa was adjudged to owe.36 However, liability 
insurers are not charities charged with distributing funds 
“unconditionally” or without regard to their insured’s fault or liability.37 
Nor would it be socially beneficial if insurance companies operated as 
charities: their revenue is driven in large part by premiums, which would 
necessarily increase if payments without regard to the insured’s fault 
became the norm. Furthermore, insurance companies have a duty to their 
shareholders to make prudent business decisions in the best interests of the 
corporation, interests that include making money.38 It is unlikely that any 
such policy of “unconditional” payment is consistent with this profit 
motive. 
 
passengers in her car. Thus, in many instances PIP benefits are paid by the injured 
party’s own insurer rather than by the insurer of the potentially at-fault driver. (The 
exception would be where a passenger sues the driver of the vehicle in which she 
was riding for personal injury.) 
 35. 3 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE 162 (3d 
ed. 1997) (quoting GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 
374 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 36. The insurer paid Ms. Jackman $3474 in medical expenses, while the jury 
adjudged Jewel Lake Villa’s liability for its proportionate share of the fault at 
$3645.09, a difference of $171.09. Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One, 170 P.3d 173, 175 
(Alaska 2007). 
 37. Cf. id. 
 38. A corporation itself does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 
Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77, 87 (Alaska 2001). However, shareholders 
invest in a corporation, including insurance companies, in the hope of making a 
profit, and the corporation’s directors and officers—those who make and 
implement its policy—have fiduciary duties to the shareholders. See ALASKA STAT. § 
10.06.450(b) (2006) (“A director shall perform the duties of a director, including 
duties as a member of a committee of the board on which the director may serve, in 
good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of 
the corporation, and with the care, including reasonable inquiry, that an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.”); 
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.483(e) (2006) (“An officer shall perform the duties of the office 
in good faith and with that degree of care, including reasonable inquiry, that an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances.”). 
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2. Choosing between forfeiture and unjust enrichment models in 
determining the allocation. The Jackman majority held that applying Jewel 
Lake Villa’s insurer’s prior payment to the entire measure of damages, that 
is, the portion of damages attributable to Ms. Jackman as well as the 
portion attributable to Jewel Lake Villa, would not result in either Jewel 
Lake Villa paying more than its fair share or in double recovery for Ms. 
Jackman.39 As noted above, the majority concluded that these concerns 
“mistakenly assume that an insurer’s unconditional advance payments of 
medical expenses must necessarily be payments based on fault,” and that 
without additional evidence that the insurer’s payments were based on 
fault, the payments would not be allocable to the insured’s share of the 
damages.40 
The majority’s response is based on a legal “forfeiture” model for 
determining allocation and does not address the equitable concerns 
implicated by the prior payment. Recall that the majority held that the 
result would be different if the prior payment had included evidence that it 
was based on Jewel Lake Villa’s fault.41 Under a forfeiture model, unless 
certain legal formalities are observed, the defendant forfeits the right to 
credit for any prior payments.42 This criticism is not intended to be a 
 
 39. Jackman, 170 P.3d at 179. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. The forfeiture model is, in reality, a consequence of a stringent application 
of the formalist method of contract interpretation. See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. 
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 569 n.53 (2003) 
(“Willistonian formalism rests on two basic claims: (1) that contract terms can be 
interpreted according to their plain meanings, and (2) that written terms have 
priority over unwritten expressions of agreement.”). An analysis of Jackman under 
contract theory is appropriate because a Rule 68 offer of judgment is an invitation 
to contract. If the offer is accepted, a contract is formed; Rule 68 provides certain 
consequences if the offer is not accepted. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68 (2007). Indeed, 
formalist models of contract have once again come into vogue. See Blake D. Morant, 
The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the 
Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 929 (noting “the resurgence of 
formalism as a dominant postulate of contract law”). However, one of the 
celebrated virtues of formalist rules is that they maximize the value of the 
relationships between contracting parties and reduce transaction costs by allowing 
the parties to speak a very specialized language. See Richard A. Epstein, The Not So 
Minimum Content of Natural Law, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 219, 251 (2005) (“In 
principle, the object of the law (think only of the role of formalism in contracts) is to 
reduce the transaction costs so as to unlock the potential sources of gain that come 
from the redeployment of assets, both human and material.”); see generally Robert E. 
Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000). It is 
unclear whether the rule announced in Jackman actually advances these objectives. 
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broadside against legal formalism; indeed, in some circumstances, formal 
legal requirements serve important functions. For example, the act of 
signing a contract or memorandum can serve evidentiary functions, by 
allowing later courts to determine whether a party assented to the terms of 
a purported contract,43 and signaling functions, by ensuring that the party 
signing a document understands the import of her signature and her legal 
rights under the document,44 which may increase contracting efficiency.45 
However, these justifications for a formalistic approach do not appear 
to be present here. Because generally accepted common law establishes 
that a defendant is entitled to credit for previous payments against any 
 
First, it actually requires that more, rather than less, effort be put into exchanges of 
money and correspondence between the parties. Second, it imposes these extra 
costs ex ante—that is, before the Rule 68 offer to contract has been contemplated. As 
discussed below in Part IV, another default rule would provide the same result, but 
without imposing the same transaction costs (in the form of additional pre-
contractual conditions). Indeed, the costs imposed by the rule set forth in Jackman 
may be so high that, even at the outset of the litigation, a defendant whose insurer 
advanced partial payments to the plaintiff might be effectively precluded from 
making a meaningful Rule 68 offer. This result defeats the substantial public 
policy—settlement—that justifies Rule 68. 
 43. See Liimatta v. Vest, 45 P.3d 310, 320 (Alaska 2002) (“[A party’s] signature is 
evidence of an unequivocal acceptance and an intent to be bound.”). As one 
commentator expresses the rule in the context of consumer contracts: 
Under the duty-to-read rule, if a consumer signs a form contract, the law 
has traditionally stated that it is reasonable for the merchant to conclude 
that the consumer has thereby given her assent to the deal. The usual 
formulation of the principle is that one having the capacity to understand a 
written document who reads it, or, without reading it or having it read to 
him, signs it, is bound by his signature. 
Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form 
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 245–46 
(2007) (internal footnote and quotation omitted). 
 44. For example, California requires absentee voters who are permitted to vote 
by fax to sign a waiver that provides: 
I, [insert name], acknowledge that by returning my voted ballot by 
facsimile transmission I have waived my right to have my ballot kept 
secret. Nevertheless, I understand that, as with any absent voter, my 
signature, whether on this oath of voter form or my identification 
envelope, will be permanently separated from my voted ballot to maintain 
its secrecy at the outset of the tabulation process and thereafter. 
R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, & Brian F. Roberts, Military Voting and the Law: 
Procedural and Technological Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem, 34 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 935, 983–84 (2007) (quoting CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3103.5 (West 2004)). 
 45. See Scott, supra note 42, at 854 (suggesting that formal adherence to 
established rules promotes stability and facilitates the creation of “standardized 
terms that parties can use thereafter in signaling their intentions”). 
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adverse judgment ultimately entered against her,46 and the Alaska 
Supreme Court’s previous holding in Rules v. Sturn established that when 
any subsequent Rule 68 offer of judgment is for new money unrelated to 
the prior payment,47 additional evidence regarding the effect of the 
payment is unnecessary. Nor is there an apparent need to notify the 
injured party of the legal effect of the payment comparable to notice 
requirements, such as those required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).48 
In the absence of such a justification, the majority’s formalist response to 
Jewel Lake Villa’s equitable argument missed the mark. 
In contrast to the legal formalism invoked by the majority, concerns 
about overpayment by the defendant and double recovery by the plaintiff 
implicate equitable considerations. The basic principles are encapsulated in 
Alaska’s fault allocation statute.49 Under Alaska law, a defendant is only 
liable for the amount of damages attributable to her fault,50 and a plaintiff 
is only entitled to recover damages to the extent she is not at fault.51 Any 
additional recovery would result in unjust enrichment to the plaintiff, who 
would be indemnified by another for damage that she caused to her own 
interests. 
Applying non-conforming prior payments to the total, pre-allocation 
measure of damages reduces the portion of damages attributable to each 
party. The Jackman Rule thus gifts a credit for Rule 68(b) purposes to the 
plaintiff in accordance with the percentage of her comparative fault.52 
 
 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. a (1979). 
 47. See 661 P.2d 615, 616 (Alaska 1983). 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–15 (2000). Many of the Truth in Lending Act’s notice 
requirements are codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2008), known as Regulation Z. 
 49. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (2006). 
 50. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (2006). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One, 170 P.3d 173, 180 (Alaska 2007). 
Moreover, the Jackman Court’s ruling leaves unclear the issue of whether a co-
defendant would be entitled to “credit” for the non-conforming payment for 
purposes of its own Rule 68 offer. Under Jackman, the non-conforming Rule 68 offer 
reduces the total amount of damages for the purpose of Rule 68(b) calculations, see 
Jackman, 170 P.3d at 180, which effectively provides a credit for Rule 68(b) purposes 
for any party found to be at fault in the case. Jackman demonstrates that the plaintiff 
benefits from this reduction in the sum of damages; the court’s rationale—that the 
payment at issue was not necessarily and specifically based on the fault of Jewel 
Lake Villa, Jackman, 170 P.3d at 178—suggests that all parties adjudged to be at fault 
are entitled to share in the windfall in proportion with their fault. As explained 
above, the at-fault co-defendant would derive a greater benefit from the non-
conforming payment as her fault increased. This result, which could mean the 
difference between a plaintiff beating or not beating the co-defendant’s Rule 68 
offer and paying hefty attorney’s fees to which the co-defendant would not 
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When calculating whether Ms. Jackman beat Jewel Lake Villa’s Rule 68 
offer, she received credit for forty-nine percent of the prior payment made 
by Jewel Lake Villa’s insurer. Perversely, under the rule in Jackman, the 
plaintiff is entitled to credit for an increasing portion of the prior payment 
as her comparative negligence increases.53 The plaintiff’s windfall also 
increases as the size of the pre-litigation payment increases. Thus, the 
Jackman rule penalizes the defendant who made the greatest pre-litigation 
payments but who has the smallest amount of actual fault for the plaintiff’s 
injuries. 
 
III.  DISASSOCIATING THE RULE 68(B)  
CALCULATIONS FROM DETERMINING JUDGMENT 
The Jackman majority appeared to limit the ruling to the Rule 68(b) 
context and does not purport to state a rule of general applicability for 
allocating payments made to a plaintiff by an insurer on behalf of a 
defendant. The majority also recognized that Ms. Jackman “had no right to 
recover these [previously paid] medical expenses again as part of the jury’s 
award; nor did she have any legitimate basis for including those payments 
in calculating her awards of prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney’s 
fees.”54 
Justice Carpeneti’s concurrence identified the tension between the 
majority’s approach and the traditional common law rule that all prior 
payments by or on behalf of a defendant are to be credited to the defendant 
when and if liability is ultimately imposed.55 Unfortunately, the 
concurrence did not elucidate this rule in any detail, and the majority did 
not address the concurrence on this point. 
There are different results for the Rule 68(b) calculation and the actual 
liability calculation under the common law rule and the Jackman rule. The 
common law approach is typified by the trial court’s calculations: The trial 
court multiplied the entire measure of damages (about $7100) by Jewel 
 
otherwise be entitled, while depriving the payor-defendant of attorney’s fees under 
Rule 68, is anomalous, to say the least. However, the anomaly serves only to point 
out the inequity of applying prior payments to any party other than the one on 
whose behalf the payment was made. 
 53. In contrast to Ms. Jackman, who was adjudged 49% at fault for her own 
injuries, a plaintiff ultimately found to be only 10% at fault for her injuries only 
receives credit under Rule 68(b) for 10% of the credit for the defendant’s insurer’s 
non-complying prior payment. 
 54. Jackman, 170 P.3d at 178. 
 55. Id. at 181 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
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Lake Villa’s potential fault (51%) to determine Jewel Lake Villa’s total 
liability (about $3600).56 It then subtracted the prior payments (about 
$3500) from that amount (resulting in liability of about $200) and added 
prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney’s fees, for total liability of about 
$900.57 Because this was less than Jewel Lake Villa’s unaccepted $1400 offer 
of judgment, it found that Jewel Lake Villa was entitled to attorney’s fees 
under Rule 68.58 
In contrast, the Jackman Court subtracted the prior payment ($3500) 
from the total damages (approximately $7200, for damages of about $3700), 
multiplied that amount by Jewel Lake Villa’s comparative fault (51%), for 
estimated liability of approximately $1900, which did not yet include 
attorney’s fees and costs. Because this amount was more favorable than 
Jewel Lake Villa’s offer of judgment, Jewel Lake Villa was not entitled to 
Rule 68 attorney’s fees.59 
This dichotomy is anomalous. Rule 68 is inextricably intertwined with 
the plaintiff’s actual recovery, and the rule governing the application of 
prior payments should reflect this connection. No persuasive reason exists 
why the Rule 68(b) calculation should be any different from what the 
plaintiff actually recovered. The solution is to overrule Jackman, aligning 
application of prior payments for Rule 68(b) purposes with the traditional, 
well-reasoned, and equitable common law rule. 
 
IV.  ESTABLISHING A DEFAULT  
RULE AND THE NEED TO CLARIFY 
Justice Carpeneti’s concurrence is correct that an unambiguous offer of 
judgment under Rule 68 is the key. However, as the majority recognized, it 
is difficult to conclude that Jewel Lake Villa’s Rule 68 offer was ambiguous. 
To borrow from the insurance policy context, ambiguity exists when the 
document in question is subject to two reasonable interpretations.60 In light 
of the Alaska Supreme Court’s prior decision in Rules, the only reasonable 
 
 56. Id. at 175–76. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 176–77. Jewel Lake Villa’s attorney’s fee award came to approximately 
$25,000. Id. at 177. 
 59. See id. at 180 n.17 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
 60. See Dugan v. Atlanta Cas. Cos., 113 P.3d 652, 655 (Alaska 2005) (“It is well 
settled that in situations in which reasonable interpretation favors the insurer, and 
any other would be strained and tenuous, no compulsion exists to torture or twist 
the language of the contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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interpretation of Jewel Lake Villa’s offer was that it was for “new 
money”—money in addition to the $3500 in prior payments.61 
However, even without the Rules decision, an interpretation in which 
Jewel Lake Villa’s $1400 Rule 68 offer included the prior $3500 payment is 
unreasonable. Such an “offer” would allow Ms. Jackman to dismiss her 
claims against Jewel Lake Villa in exchange for less than Jewel Lake Villa 
had already paid her. This arrangement would appear to involve a 
payment from Ms. Jackman to Jewel Lake Villa of approximately $2100. A 
Rule 68 offer that implicitly contemplated payment by the plaintiff to the 
defendant would be highly unusual, and any offer contemplating such a 
term could be expected to say so explicitly. A practical consideration of the 
mechanics by which Jewel Lake Villa’s hypothetical proposal—to resolve 
the claims against it with a payment from Ms. Jackman in its own favor—
demonstrate that the offer was necessarily for “new money.” To the extent 
that Jewel Lake Villa desired to recover pre-litigation medical payments to 
Ms. Jackman, it would have had to file a counterclaim against her under 
Rule 13 of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure for reimbursement.62 Jewel 
Lake Villa would then have had to serve a separate Rule 68 offer of 
judgment on Ms. Jackman for an amount that it would take in satisfaction 
of that claim, while simultaneously serving a Rule 68 offer of judgment for 
a de minimis amount with respect to Ms. Jackman’s claim against it. 
Indeed, the rule announced in Jackman may generate increased 
uncertainty regarding the treatment of any given pre-litigation payment for 
purposes of Rule 68(b). While the majority held that in order to receive 
credit on prior payments for Rule 68(b) purposes there must be 
accompanying evidence that the payment was based on the insured’s 
fault,63 the opinion was silent as to the quantum or method of proof 
required. The concurrence’s suggested notification—“based on [the 
insured’s] potential fault for the accident”64—is based on language in the 
majority opinion and is likely sufficient, but is not controlling. Rather than 
forcing attorneys and insurance professionals—and eventually plaintiffs in 
receipt of partial payments and subsequent offers of judgment—to 
speculate as to the sufficiency of the notifications in partial payments to 
injured parties, the Jackman Court should have established a clear and 
 
 61. See Rules v. Sturn, 661 P.2d 615, 617–18 (Alaska 1983) (holding that where 
terms of Rule 68 offer are silent as to prior payments, offer may be construed to be 
for an amount in addition to any previous payments). 
 62. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 13 (2007). 
 63. Jackman, 170 P.3d. at 179. 
 64. See id. at 182 (Carpeneti, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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easily applied default rule for the allocation of prior payments. To avoid 
confusion and address the equitable concerns described above, the rule of 
application of prior payments in the Rule 68(b) context should be in line 
with the rule for application to the actual judgment. 
Indeed, Jackman presented an ideal case for establishing a default 
application rule for prior payments in the Rule 68(b) context. As noted 
above, Jackman involved an unambiguous Rule 68 offer for “new money,” 
even without controlling precedent, so the court could have announced a 
rule of application of prior payments to the portion of damages allocated to 
the defendant without unreasonably surprising either party. However, the 
court may correct this oversight through its constitutional power to 
establish rules for procedure in the judicial system.65 
Such a rule-based “fix” would not be difficult, and could be 
accomplished by adding the italicized language to the existing text of 
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a): 
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, either the 
party making a claim or the party defending against a claim may 
serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be 
entered in complete satisfaction of the claim for the money or 
property or to the effect specified in the offer, which shall be in 
addition to any sums paid by or on behalf of the party on account of the 
claim it is defending, with costs then accrued. The offer may not be 
revoked in the 10 day period following service of the offer. If 
within 10 days after service of the offer the adverse party serves 
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then 
file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of 
service, and the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted 
within 10 days is considered withdrawn, and evidence of the 
offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. 
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude 
a subsequent offer.66 
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(b) would then be amended to include 
the italicized language below: 
If the judgment finally rendered by the court is at least 5 percent 
less favorable to the offeree than the sum of the offer plus any 
previous payments made by or on behalf of the party on account of the 
claim it is defending, or, if there are multiple defendants, at least 10 
 
 65. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15. 
 66. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(a) (italicized portion appended). 
04__ROESCH.DOC 5/27/2008  1:41:45 PM 
 
172 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 25:157 
 
 
percent less favorable to the offeree than the sum of the offer and 
any previous payments made by or on behalf of the party on account of 
the claim it is defending, the offeree, whether the party making the 
claim or defending against the claim, shall pay all costs as 
allowed under the Civil Rules and shall pay reasonable actual 
attorney’s fees incurred by the offeror from the date the offer was 
made as follows . . . .67 
The above-described changes to Rule 68 would provide clarity and 
uniformity in the application of prior payments between Rule 68 
calculations and the calculation of any judgment against the party 
defending a claim. Moreover, this rule would eliminate potential 
ambiguity over whether any Rule 68 offer was for “new money” or 
includes previous payments, codifying in more visible form the holding of 
Rules v. Sturn.68 Indeed, the other key holding of Rules—the irrevocability 
of Rule 68 offers of judgment—has since been codified.69 
 
V.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Under Jackman, insurers should take steps to protect their interests 
when making payments in situations other than obtaining a complete 
release of their insureds.70 
All payments made prior to final resolution of the controversy through 
settlement or judgment should contain the qualification that they are based 
on the fault or potential fault of the insured. Justice Carpeneti’s 
concurrence, borrowing language from the majority opinion, suggested 
that all such payments should be accompanied by a notice that such 
payment is made “based on [the insured’s] potential fault for the accident” 
or an equivalent qualification that will provide sufficient evidence that the 
payment is not “unconditional.”71 Because this disclaimer was suggested 
 
 67. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(b) (italicized portion appended). 
 68. 661 P.2d 615, 618 (Alaska 1983) (“It is a mystery why . . . if the appellants 
intended all along to offset the advance payments they had made, they did not 
actually figure the offset into the numbers while forming their offer.”). 
 69. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(a) (“The offer may not be revoked in the 10 day 
period following service of the offer.”). 
 70. The discussion in this, or any other section of this Comment, is not 
personalized legal advice, nor is it intended to replace the advice of legal counsel. 
The author recommends consulting with an attorney regarding the proper 
procedure for protecting one’s own rights or the rights of one’s insured when 
making a pre-litigation payment to a potential claimant. 
 71. Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One, 170 P.3d 173, 182 (Alaska 2007) (Carpeneti, 
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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only in the concurrence, it is not controlling; therefore, the majority, which 
unfortunately failed to provide an example of an adequate notice, may 
reject this language as insufficient. However, based on its endorsement by 
a member of the Alaska Supreme Court, who was quoting the majority, the 
court is likely to hold the above-quoted notice sufficient. 
When including a disclaimer or qualification as contemplated by the 
Jackman Court, however, insurers should be careful not to make an 
inadvertent admission of liability. Alaska Rule of Evidence 409 provides 
that “[e]vidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, 
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to 
prove liability for the injury.”72 The Commentary states that this Rule: 
[D]oes not extend to conduct or statements not a part of the act of 
furnishing or offering or promising to pay. This difference in 
treatment arises from fundamental differences in nature. 
Communication is essential if compromises are to be effected, 
and consequently broad protection of statements is needed. This 
is not so in cases of payments or offers or promises to pay 
medical expenses, where factual statements may be expected to 
be incidental in nature and where protecting such statements 
would not encourage the approved behavior. A party can offer to 
pay medical expenses without making statements as to liability.73 
Contrary to the Commentary, the rule announced in Jackman does require 
the insurer to make statements at least touching on liability when making 
advance medical payments if the insurer is to retain its rights under Rule 
68(b).74 Alternatively, the Alaska Supreme Court could, and should, 
exclude such statements under Alaska Rule of Evidence 408 (offers of 
compromise) or 403 (evidence who’s prejudicial effect outweighs probative 
value). 
It would be a cruel paradox indeed if a party were required to admit 
fault, or for an insurer to be required to generate admissible evidence of its 
insured’s liability, in order to receive credit for pre-litigation payments to 
the plaintiff. As a practical matter, a liability insurer may be unlikely to 
make partial payments on a third-party claim where the insured is not at 
fault or liability is not contested, and the adverse affect on subsequent 
litigation over the amount of damages might be minimal. However, the 
insurer may have other strategic reasons for making the payment, or 
 
 72. ALASKA R. EVID. 409. 
 73. ALASKA R. EVID. 409 cmt. 
 74. See supra Part IV. 
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subsequent information may come to light casting doubt upon the 
insured’s previously assumed fault, in which case the insured/defendant 
would have to explain away its purported admission. In light of the 
concerns about liability admissions present in the concurrence’s 
formulation of the required notice, therefore, an insurer should make as 
minimal a statement as possible about its insured’s potential fault. Rather 
than trying to improve upon the sample notice provided in Justice 
Carpeneti’s concurrence,75 therefore, this Comment recommends using that 
notice only. While the court would be ill positioned to construe its own 
language as an inadvertent admission of liability, further or more elaborate 
statements might not be afforded the same protection.76 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The default application of prior payments to the full measure of 
damages, rather than to the portion of liability allocated to the defendant, 
for the purposes of Rule 68(b), ignores the fundamental nature of the 
liability insurance business, creates the potential for unjust enrichment, and 
elevates an unjustified formalism over sound equitable considerations. 
Moreover, there appears to be no persuasive reason to treat calculations 
under Rule 68(b) differently from the calculation of the actual judgment. A 
simple reform under the Alaska Supreme Court’s constitutional rule-
making power would correct this unsound rule. Until such a correction is 
made, insurers and self-insured defendants would do well to protect their 
interests by including a carefully drafted and appropriate notice in all 
payments to plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs that do not result in a full 
release. 
 
 75. Jackman, 170 P.3d at 182 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). 
 76. Indeed, the requirement that insurers and potential defendants walk this 
fine line between protecting their interests and admitting liability while making 
pre-litigation payments to a (then-potential) plaintiff is yet another indication that 
the Jackman rule is unsound. The danger to insurers and their insureds now 
inherent in making pre-litigation payments to potential plaintiffs increases the cost 
of this activity, which has been identified as a public policy of the state. See ALASKA 
R. EVID. 409 cmt. (“Prompt payment of medical and other expenses is encouraged 
and the humanitarian nature of the payment or offer is highlighted.”); Jackman, 170 
P.3d at 182 (Carpeneti, J., concurring). Moreover, insurers might rationally conclude 
that the inclusion of language suggesting fault on the part of the insured might 
encourage the then-potential plaintiff to file suit, which would also discourage pre-
litigation payments of medical or other expenses, thus frustrating the above-
described public policy. 
